A direct deposit change redirects someone's wages. Treat it like a change of beneficiary, not a profile update. Verification through an independent channel before the next payroll run prevents the worst outcome: paying a caregiver's wages into an account controlled by someone else.
The pattern behind payroll diversion
The usual scheme starts with a compromised or spoofed employee email. The sender asks to update direct deposit near payday and attaches new account details. Urgency is the point: a clerk may miss a lookalike reply-to address or a phone number changed in the same message.
Insiders can use the same path. Every change needs verification through a channel the requester does not control.
Publish the rule before a request arrives
Put the policy in the handbook and repeat it at onboarding. State the accepted request method, identity checks, approval steps, and the payroll cycle when a change takes effect.
Accept requests through the payroll or HR system, a signed form delivered in person, or a secure portal. Do not accept a change by email, text, phone, or a note passed through a supervisor. If an employee cannot use the portal, offer a documented accommodation, not an exception that skips verification.
Require the account to be held in the employee's own name. Reject third-party accounts, prepaid cards, and accounts belonging to a relative unless payroll leadership approves a written exception and counsel reviews it.
Freeze changes near the payroll cutoff
Start the freeze a set number of days before payroll cutoff and end it after payday. Routine changes wait for the next cycle, and the dates appear on the payroll calendar.
Urgent exceptions need a path: a documented account closure, suspected fraud on the existing account, or a new hire whose first payment is at risk. The payroll manager and one HR leader approve together, and verification still applies.
Call back to a number you already have
Use the number in the personnel file or HR system, never the number in the request, the email signature, or caller ID. If the number changed recently, verify it through HR first.
A callback script
"[Name] from [agency] payroll. I'm calling about a direct deposit change we received. Can you confirm your employee ID and hire date? ... We received a request to send pay to an account ending in [last four]. Did you submit that request? ... What day did you submit it? ... We will send a masked confirmation to your portal inbox. Please check your first payslip after the change."
Never read the full account number aloud. Never ask for a Social Security number, password, or one-time code by phone, and do not accept a texted ID photo as sole proof. If the employee did not submit the request, stop and move to the fraud path.
Require two people and separate duties
The person who prepares the change should not verify it. A payroll clerk enters the approved form, a second trained reviewer completes the callback and compares the details, and the payroll manager releases the change.
| Step | Evidence retained | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Request | Signed form or portal entry | Employee |
| Callback | Known number, date, verifier | HR reviewer |
| Approval | Second signature | Payroll manager |
| Confirmation | Masked account notice | Payroll |
In a small agency, the owner can review, but one person must not prepare, verify, and approve alone.
Record each step and its performer. If the verifier cannot reach the employee, the change stays pending.
Validate the account and the document
The request should show the bank name, routing number, account number, account type, and the name on the account. Compare the account name with the payroll record. A mismatch is a stop-and-verify event, not a typo to fix silently.
Use your payroll provider's validation method, such as account verification or a small test deposit. Reject accounts that cannot be validated. For an exception, request a bank letter on institution letterhead and call the bank's published number.
Store only the masked account number in notes and email. Full details belong in payroll, not a shared drive or chat.
Confirm with the employee on a second channel
After approval, send a confirmation showing the last four digits, account type, and effective pay date. Use the portal or the personal email on file, not a new address supplied with the request. Ask the employee to confirm receipt and check the first payslip.
This closes the loop and records the confirmation if the employee later disputes the change. If the employee says something is wrong, freeze the next payment and reopen verification.
Escalate red flags and work the fraud path
Stop when a request arrives just before payroll, contact details change at the same time, the account name does not match, the bank is unfamiliar, the sender pressures staff to skip the callback, or one person asks to change several employees' accounts.
If fraud is suspected
Do not reply to the requester. Freeze the change, preserve the original email and headers, notify the payroll provider and bank, and involve IT or your security contact. Tell the employee through a known channel. The FTC data breach response guide and IdentityTheft.gov explain reporting steps for affected individuals. For phishing, CISA's guidance covers reporting and containment.
Preserve evidence and never use the same thread.
A worked example
A caregiver emails payroll on Thursday before a Friday payday asking to switch banks. The form lists an out-of-state bank with a mismatched account name. The clerk enters it but does not release it.
The verifier calls the number in the HR system. It is disconnected. HR avoids the email number and arranges a video call through the emergency contact. The caregiver confirms she did not send the request.
Payroll freezes the change, notifies the bank and provider, preserves the email, and asks IT to review her account. Pay goes to the existing verified account.
Metrics, evidence, and failure modes
Track changes, callbacks, rejections, exceptions, verification time, first-cycle errors, and suspected fraud. Review monthly for patterns like repeated requests from one supervisor.
Retain the request, verification notes, callback date and number source, second approval, validation result, masked confirmation, and effective date per retention schedule.
The failures repeat: trusting caller ID, calling the number on the form, letting one person prepare and approve, accepting a scanned letter as identity proof, processing after the freeze, emailing full account numbers, and skipping confirmation for a routine-looking change.
If payroll is one of an office manager's duties, a trained assistant can log requests, prepare the verification packet, run the callback checklist, and maintain the audit file. Approval and fraud decisions stay with payroll leadership. Contact us to design the separation of duties, or review the HR onboarding support and compliance boundaries before the next payroll cycle.

