The threat model
Direct deposit is a convenience until it becomes a route for theft. A caregiver's pay can be redirected by someone who compromises an email account, impersonates the caregiver to HR, obtains payroll access, or works inside payroll. The change may be small, timed just before payday, or spread across several employees.
Four paths deserve separate treatment. In business email compromise, an attacker gains access to a caregiver's or supervisor's mailbox and sends a request that looks routine. In impersonation, someone calls HR claiming to be the caregiver and asks for an urgent update because of a bank merger or lost card. In an insider change, a payroll employee alters an account or approves a change without review. In a vendor or system compromise, an attacker uses a portal or integration credential to modify bank data at scale.
The common thread is authority. The attacker needs only one path where a request is trusted, a change is accepted, and the pay run executes before anyone confirms it with the employee. The design should make that path slow and visible.
Control objectives
A useful framework states what must be true before money moves. Authorization means only an employee, or an authorized representative, may request a change to that employee's deposit account. Authenticity means the agency establishes that the request came from the employee, not someone with access to the employee's email or personal details. Integrity means the account data are complete, valid, and recorded without alteration.
Timeliness, confidentiality, recoverability, and auditability complete the set. A change requested the day before payroll creates a different risk than one requested three weeks earlier. Confidentiality protects bank and identity data. Recoverability requires a plan for stopping a payment and restoring the correct account. Auditability requires a record of who requested, verified, approved, and when.
These objectives compete. A same-day change is convenient but removes verification time. A long freeze protects the pay run but inconveniences an employee whose account closed. Set the trade-off in policy, not in the judgment of whoever answers the phone.
Callback verification to a known number
The strongest single control is a callback to a number already on file, not one supplied in the request. An attacker who controls the request can supply a number that rings the attacker, a voicemail box, or a forwarding service. A number from the employee record is harder to manipulate, though not immune to a compromised phone or a separate fraudulent change.
The independent number problem
The callback is independent only if the number was not changed in the same transaction. If the employee's contact record is editable by the person who processes deposit changes, the attacker can update the phone number and pass the callback. Separate contact-data changes from bank-data changes, require extra verification for a recent phone change, and compare the callback number with the emergency contact or original application.
Use a channel the employee expects. A voicemail is weaker than a live conversation, and a text to a number that may be controlled by the attacker is weaker still. Document the number dialed, time, person reached, and questions asked. If the employee cannot be reached, hold the change.
What the caller should confirm
Confirm identity with information not fully available in the request, such as a payroll identifier, recent pay amount, or supervisor name. Read back the bank name and last four digits, and ask the employee to confirm the change is expected. Do not read the full account number aloud or send it by email.
Tell the employee when the change takes effect, how to verify it on the next pay stub, and whom to call if pay is wrong. That creates a second chance to detect impersonation. A caregiver who did not request a change will say so if the agency reaches the right person.
Two-person approval and freeze windows
No single person should be able to change a bank account and release a pay run. A two-person rule can be simple: one person verifies the request, another approves the change, and neither supervises the employee's time or pay data. In a small agency, the second approver may be an owner or finance contractor, but the role should be named in policy.
A freeze window adds time between the change and the next payment. The length balances employee need against fraud risk. A common design requires changes several business days before payday, with exceptions handled by documented escalation and second verification. Measure the window in business days before the run, not calendar days that may include a weekend.
Exceptions are where controls fail. An urgent request from a long-term employee, an owner's message, or a bank merger story can persuade a reviewer to skip the callback. Name acceptable reasons, require a second approver, and record the reason. A control that can be waived under pressure is not a control.
Account validation and bank data quality
Validation is not verification
Account validation services can confirm that an account number is structurally valid or exists. They do not prove the employee owns the account. An attacker can supply a valid account held by a money mule. Treat validation as a data quality step, not identity verification.
Name matching is also imperfect. A married employee may have an account under a different name, a joint account may list a spouse, and a new account may not yet match payroll. A mismatch should trigger review, not automatic rejection. A match should not replace the callback.
Failed deposits and reversals
A failed deposit is both an operational problem and a detection signal. If a deposit is returned because the account is closed or the name does not match, freeze further changes, contact the employee through a known channel, and verify the account before reprocessing. A pattern of returns across employees may indicate compromised accounts or coordinated fraud.
Monitor for multiple employees using the same bank account. Some shared accounts are legitimate, especially among family members, but a cluster of unrelated employees pointing to one account is a red flag. Document the explanation or escalate it.
Detection metrics and monitoring
Metrics should surface changes that deserve review, not prove that fraud is absent. Useful measures include bank changes per pay period, the share submitted inside the freeze window, the share approved without a documented callback, changes per approver, and employees with more than one change in a short period. A sudden increase before a holiday or payday is worth examining.
Access logs add another layer. Look for payroll account changes outside normal hours, from unusual locations, or by accounts with broad permissions. Repeated failed logins followed by a successful change, new email forwarding rules, or mailbox access from an unfamiliar device may indicate compromise. These are signals, not proof, and should be investigated like any financial exception.
Separate leading from lagging indicators. The share of changes verified by callback is a leading indicator of control performance. Reversals or employee complaints are lagging indicators of harm. Report counts, denominators, and dispositions.
Employee notification and incident response
Tell employees in advance how the agency will contact them about a deposit change and what it will never ask for. A short notice at onboarding makes a suspicious call easier to recognize. Explain the freeze window, the callback process, and the channel for reporting a suspicious request.
When diversion is suspected, move quickly and document. Freeze the change, stop the payment if possible, contact the bank, preserve logs and emails, and notify the employee through a known channel. FTC breach response guidance and IdentityTheft.gov frame identity theft response; IRS Identity Theft Central covers tax-related cases. If protected health information is touched, the HIPAA Security Rule and the agency's breach assessment process apply to that portion.
Review how the attacker got in. A single changed account may be the visible symptom of a compromised mailbox, a reused password, or an insider. Closing the change without closing the access path leaves the door open.
Access control, MFA, and evidence retention
Payroll systems should use least privilege. Most HR staff do not need to edit bank accounts, and payroll staff should not approve their own changes. Administrative accounts should be separate, and access removed when an employee leaves or changes roles. CISA's MFA and password guidance describes baseline practice, NIST SP 800-63B discusses authentication assurance and phishing resistance, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework organizes the work.
MFA helps, but not all MFA is equal. A one-time code sent to a compromised phone can be intercepted or relayed. A phishing-resistant authenticator is stronger, especially for payroll administrators. Prioritize accounts that can change bank data, not only email.
Retain the request, callback record, approval, system logs, and employee notification for the period required by the agency's records schedule and applicable wage and tax rules. The DOL recordkeeping fact sheet and IRS Publication 15 provide payroll record context, but confirm specific obligations with advisers. The record should reconstruct who changed what, when, and on what evidence.
Limitations and what the controls can and cannot prove
No control eliminates the risk. A determined attacker can compromise a known phone, persuade an employee to confirm a fraudulent change, or collude with an insider. A callback can fail when the employee is traveling, hospitalized, or unreachable. A freeze window can create hardship. A validation service can confirm an account exists without confirming ownership.
The framework cannot prove a change was fraudulent. It can show that a control was followed, a callback documented, or an exception occurred. It can shorten the diversion window and improve recovery chances. It cannot guarantee recovery after funds leave the account, and it cannot replace law enforcement, bank, or legal advice.
The practical test is whether the agency can answer four questions for any bank change: who requested it, how identity was verified, who approved it, and when it took effect. If those answers are recorded and reviewable, the agency has moved from trust in a request to evidence of a control. For related material, see payroll hours reconciliation and HIPAA security incident response. To discuss a controlled payroll change workflow, contact us.

